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The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and 
Acceptance  
Alice Férot* 
The theory of loss of chance has a distinctive feature: wherever it 
is implemented, it tends to be, at least initially, misunderstood or 
somewhat distorted, thus hindering its acceptance.1  In this respect, the 
United States is no different than other countries that have adopted 
it.2  The reticence in the United States toward the theory of loss of 
chance, however, has remained acute over the years.3   
The theory of loss of chance allows an aggrieved party to assert a 
claim against a tortfeasor whose conduct decreased or eliminated the 
chance of a favorable outcome.4  Accordingly, the theory may apply to 
                                                                                                                           
 
∗    Juris Doctor, Florida International University College of Law, 2012, LL.M. graduate, New 
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 1   For example, in France in the 1970s and in Italy in the 1980s, when the theory of loss of 
chance was in its infancy, the theory was heavily criticized and misunderstood, even though in 
both countries the theory is now widely accepted and implemented in many diverse areas.  See, 
e.g., Claire Beraud, Le principe de la Réparation de la Perte de Chance [Indemnification of the 
Loss of Chance] 17 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.droit.univ-
paris5.fr/AOCIVCOM/01memoir/BeraudM.pdf; Luca D’Apollo, Perdita di Chance: Danno 
Risarcibile, Onus Probandi e Criteri di Liquidazione [Loss of Chance: Compensable Injury, Bur-
den of Proof and Assessment Criteria], ALTALEX (Nov. 26, 2007), 
http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=39075#sdendnote16anc. 
 2 For example, a number of courts continue to frame the issue of the loss of chance as a 
theory of causation rather than a theory of injury.  See, e.g., Mandros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 
310 (R.I. 2008) (holding that the theory of loss of chance is an alternative to conventional no-
tions of causation). 
 3 A majority of states reject the theory of loss of chance.  See, e.g., McAfee v. Baptist Med. 
Ctr., 641 So. 2d 265, 267 (Ala. 1994); Crosby v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924, 930 (Alaska 
1999); Holt ex rel. Estate of Holt v. Wagner, 43 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Ark. 2001); Williams v. Wraxall, 
39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 666 (Cal. Ct App. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (West) (abro-
gating Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (ab-
rogating Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 366 (S.D.2000)). 
 4 The definition given by Black’s Law Dictionary is the following: a rule in some states 
providing a claim against a doctor who has engaged in medical malpractice that, although it does 
not result in a particular injury, decreases or eliminates the chance of surviving or recovering 
from the preexisting condition for which the doctor was consulted.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1031 (9th ed. 2009). 
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a number of situations, including the loss of an opportunity for promo-
tions in an employment discrimination case,5 or the loss of an oppor-
tunity to make a profit in a breach of contract case.6  In the United 
States, the theory of loss of chance has been implemented mostly in 
the area of medical malpractice.7  Usually, a patient, or his or her rep-
resentative, will sue a healthcare provider for a failure to diagnose or a 
failure to cure a medical condition that resulted in the diminution of 
the patient’s chance to survive or recover from the condition.8  
The theory seems to have first appeared as early as 1966 when 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly addressed it in the sem-
inal case Hicks v. United States.9  In Hicks, the Court held that a physi-
cian’s failure to diagnose an intestinal obstruction of a patient was 
negligence.10  The Court held that “[i]f there was any substantial possi-
bility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answer-
able.”11 
A few years later, in 1974, a New York case also addressed the is-
sue of loss of chance.12  In Beth Israel, the New York Supreme Court 
held that a patient who died from an aneurism could recover for the 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the theory of loss of 
chance is “peculiarly appropriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion,” but 
refusing to hold that the theory was applicable to the case because the issue had not been briefed 
by the parties). 
 6 See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that it is 
now an “accepted principle of contract law . . . that recovery will be allowed where a plaintiff has 
been deprived of an opportunity or chance to gain an award or profit even where damages are 
uncertain”).  In Miller, an insurer had breached a promise to return a wrecked automobile which 
the insured needed as evidence in a planned products liability suit against a manufacturer.  Id. at 
25.  The Court held that the insured could recover against the insurer for the lost chance of win-
ning the product liability case.  Id. at 29. 
 7 See, e.g., Hardy v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 1996910 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Okla. 1996) (limiting the 
application of the theory of loss of chance to medical malpractice cases); see also Frey v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC, 379 F. App’x 727, 729 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 8 See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Iowa 1986) (finding that the physi-
cian, who had failed to diagnose breast cancer, had caused his patient to lose chances of sur-
vival). 
 9 Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 628-30 (4th Cir. 1966). 
 10 Id. at 632. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff’d, 337 N.E.2d 
128, 128 (1975); see also Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of Chance Doctrine: 
An Argument for A New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 22 (2003) (“Israel Hospital 
became the first case to expressly announce this doctrine.”); Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of 
Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for Human Life, 42 S.D.L. REV. 279, 287-88 (1997); Darrell 
L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modern Proportional Approach to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 759, 765 (1992).  It should also be noted that courts have addressed the issue of loss of 
chance of profit in breach of contract actions well before the Beth Israel case.  See Robert H. 
Sturgess, The “Loss of Chance” Doctrine of Damages for Breach of Contract, FLA. B.J., October 
2005, at 29 (finding that Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.Y. 129 (1868) was the first instance where a court 
was faced with a loss of chance in a suit for breach of contract). 
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loss of 20% to 40% chance of survival due to the defendants’ failure 
to give the patient a medication.13  The Court, however, awarded dam-
ages for the ultimate outcome, the death, not the loss of chance.14  At 
the time, the decision attracted little attention and the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed without opinion.15   
In 1978, in Hamil v. Bashline,16 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania was one of the first courts to rely on section 323 of the Restate-
ment of Torts to expand the increased risk of harm to instances of loss 
of chance.17  In Hamil, the wife of the decedent brought a wrongful 
death action against a hospital for failure to properly treat her hus-
band’s myocardial infarction.18  The Court vacated and remanded a 
trial court order because the jury had been wrongly instructed that the 
loss of chance could not be considered a proximate cause of the pa-
tient’s death.19 
In 1981, Professor Joseph H. King wrote the first scholarly article 
in the United States dealing with the loss of chance in the Yale Law 
Journal.20  Professor King theorized that “the loss of a chance of 
achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence 
should be compensable.”21  He advocated for a “reevaluation of the 
traditional ways of thinking about the interest for which relief is 
sought and the role of chance in valuing that interest.”22  Professor 
King, however, formulated the theory of loss in chance in terms of 
causation and burden of proof, not in terms of injury.23 
To this day, the American Law Institute (ALI), the independent 
organization producing “Restatements” of law to clarify, modernize, 
and otherwise improve the law,24 has taken no position on the issue.25  
The cases discussed above have been followed by numerous state 
supreme court decisions on the loss of chance.26  While not every state 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510. 
 14 Id. at 509. 
 15 Id., aff’d, 337 N.E.2d 128, 128 (1975). 
 16 Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978). 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 1283. 
 19 Id. at 1289-90. 
 20 Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving 
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1370 (1981). 
 21 Id. at 1354. 
 22 Id. at 1370. 
 23 Id. at 1354. 
 24 ALI Overview, ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last vis-
ited June 9, 2013). 
 25 Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt Necessities, and the Tale of Two Cities, 43 SUFFOLK 
U.L. REV. 327, 352 (2010). 
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has addressed the theory of loss of chance, those that have, implement 
it in very different ways.27  Three trends can be identified:28 some states 
recognize the theory;29 some states refuse to recognize it and instead 
indemnify the loss of the favorable outcome through the use of a re-
laxed causation requirement;30 and some states refuse to indemnify for 
loss of chance.31  In some instances, confusion surrounding its applica-
tion remains.  The loss of chance is not a theory of causation but a 
theory of injury.32  In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff claiming 
a loss of chance must prove that the physician’s negligence caused the 
injury, which is a decreased chance of recovery.33  As a result, the en-
dorsement or rejection of the theory should not be based on argu-
ments relating to the applicable causation standard or burden of 
proof.  This comment is an attempt to clarify the theory and to address 
how and why some jurisdictions may have misunderstood it.  This 
comment also encourages these states to either recognize or reject the 
damage of loss of chance but in a manner that does not distort the 
theory, and in a manner compatible with the applicable standard of 
causation and burden of proof.   
This comment will first address (I) the nature of the theory of loss 
of chance, then (II) its uneven implementation in the United States 
among the fifty states.  
I. THE LOSS OF CHANCE: A THEORY OF INJURY 
The core concept of the theory is the recognition that a loss of 
chance is in itself an injury.34  Because a chance has some inherent 
value, a tortious deprivation of chance should trigger the tortfeasor’s 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See, e.g., Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, 324-25 (W. Va. 1983); Gooding v. Univ. 
Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 
605 (Ariz. 1984);
 
Brown v. Koulizakis, 331 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Va. 1985). 
 27 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND 
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS, 272-73 (Foundation Press, 11th ed., 2005). 
 28 Id. 
 29 See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008). 
 30 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983). 
 31 See, e.g., Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1015. 
 32 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 823 (holding that the loss of chance is a theory of injury, not 
causation). 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. (holding that the loss of chance is a theory of injury, not causation); Jorgenson v. 
Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370 (S.D. 2000) (“Courts that adopt the loss of chance doctrine in effect 
recognize a lost chance as a distinct cause of action, treating it as the compensable injury, not the 
underlying injury itself.”). 
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liability.35  Once the principle that a loss of chance is an injury worthy 
of redress is accepted,36 the traditional concepts of tort apply.37   
A. The Elements of the Theory 
In a typical loss of chance case, the plaintiff must prove the tradi-
tional elements of negligence: (1) an injury; (2) the defendant’s breach 
of a duty of care; and (3) causality between the injury and the breach.38 
1. The Injury 
To recover for a loss of chance, the plaintiff must prove that she 
or he initially had at least some chance of a favorable outcome.39  Ac-
cordingly, no action will lie if the patient had no chance of a favorable 
outcome before the tortious action occurred.40  In Broussard v. United 
States,41 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
decision denying recovery for a loss of chance when the patient had 
no chance of survival.  The parents of a three-year-old boy sued a hos-
pital employee for medical malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act because the employee had failed to promptly treat the child upon 
his arrival.42  After a bench trial, the district court found that the par-
ents could not recover for loss of chance of their son because the 
“[child]’s injuries were so severe and so extensive that nothing could 
have been done for him that would have saved his life.”43  In other 
words, even with prompt and proper treatment, the child could not 
have survived.  Therefore, the negligence of the employee could not 
have caused the loss of a chance the child never had.44   
                                                                                                                           
 35 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 823 (holding that the loss of chance doctrine views a person’s 
prospects for surviving a serious medical condition as something of value). 
 36 Jorgenson, 616 N.W.2d at 370. 
 37 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828-29 (holding that Massachusetts joins the majority of 
states who have endorsed the theory “to ensure that the fundamental aims and principles of 
[Massachusetts] tort law remain fully applicable to the modern world of sophisticated medical 
diagnosis and treatment”).  
 38 See id. at 823 (finding that the recognition of the theory of loss of chance comports with 
the common law of wrongful death)  
 39 See Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 172 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. at 172-74. 
 43 Id. at 178. 
 44 This principle according to which a healthcare provider cannot be liable for an outcome 
that would have occurred even in the absence of negligence is not limited to loss of chance cases.  
See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1218 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the cause of a 
child’s death was the lethal dose of aspirin the child accidently absorbed and not the subsequent 
physician’s failure to diagnose the poisoning nor the physician’s prescription of aspirin because 
the condition of the child was already hopeless before the negligent act). 
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Likewise, a plaintiff will not recover for a loss of chance if the 
negligence of the physician, in fact, caused the unfavorable outcome.  
If the patient had a 100% chance to be cured or saved and the tortious 
act of the physician caused all this chance to be lost, then the tortfea-
sor is responsible for the unfavorable outcome, not the loss of chance.45   
Additionally, the loss of chance causes an injury independent 
from the unfavorable outcome.  The loss of chance is the original in-
jury.  It is abstract and contains some uncertainty: the loss of chance 
may or may not have caused the adverse outcome.  Even when the 
unfavorable outcome is realized, this uncertainty remains.  Accord-
ingly, under the theory, the plaintiff is not required to prove with cer-
tainty that the unfavorable outcome would have been avoided if the 
chance had not been lost.46  In Hamil, where the wife of the decedent 
brought a wrongful death action against a hospital for failure to prop-
erly treat her husband, who had suffered a heart attack, the court held 
that the law “does not require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that 
the patient would have lived had [the patient] been hospitalized and 
operated on promptly.”47  Similarly, in Hicks v. United States,48 where a 
physician mistakenly diagnosed a deadly intestinal obstruction as gas-
troenteritis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when a de-
fendant’s tortious conduct terminates a person’s chance of survival, “it 
does not lie in the defendant’s mouth to raise conjectures as to the 
measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possibility of reali-
zation.”49  This is because, the Court further stated, “[r]arely is it possi-
ble to demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have hap-
pened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to 
pass.”50  Requiring that the patient prove he would have lived or re-
covered would be an “unreasonable burden.”51 
The unfavorable outcome, contrary to the loss of chance, is con-
crete and certain: it is the state of the patient.  While the two injuries, 
the loss of chance and the occurring of the adverse outcome, are dis-
tinct, they are also complementary: they are both necessary to trigger 
liability.52  Recovery for the loss of chance is contingent upon either 
                                                                                                                           
 45 LeBlanc v. Barry, 790 So. 2d 75, 80-81 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that, where a patient 
had 90-100% chance of survival, the trial court in fact considered the patient’s chance of survival, 
even if the trial court spoke in terms of an award for wrongful death).   
 46 Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978). 
 47 See id. 
 48 Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) 
 49 Id. at 632. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Smith v. State, 523 So. 2d 815, 822 (La. 1988). 
 52 Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56-57 n. 43 (Mich. 1990) (holding that a cause of 
action for loss of an opportunity of achieving a better result accrues when harm and damages 
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the realization of the unfavorable outcome or the certainty that the 
unfavorable outcome will occur in the future.53  For purposes of illus-
tration, if a physician fails to treat a patient who was in critical condi-
tion upon his arrival in the hospital, there are only two possible out-
comes: either the patient will live or he will die.  Assuming that the 
patient had a 40% chance of survival upon his arrival and lost a 20% 
chance of survival as a result of the delayed treatment, the patient still 
has a 20% chance of survival after the negligence.  The loss of chance 
occurred at the time of the negligence; it is abstract.  It is distinct from 
the ultimate outcome, which is future and concrete: this is the death or 
the survival of the patient.  The patient, however, will only recover for 
his loss of chance if he both lost chance of survival and ultimately dies 
or is terminally ill.54  The unfavorable outcome may take many differ-
ent forms: it might be the death of the patient,55 aggravated symp-
toms,56 or a lack of improvement of the condition of the patient.57    
The loss of chance is an injury that also should be distinguished 
from other damages resulting from the negligence.  These derivative 
injuries may include physical pain and suffering, mental anguish re-
sulting from the patient’s awareness that chances of survival were lost, 
worsening of the patient’s condition, a longer or more invasive medi-
cal treatment, disfigurement, medical expenses, loss of consortium, 
society and companionship in a marital relationship, and the shorten-
ing of life.  In Alexander v. Scheid,58 the plaintiff brought a medical 
malpractice action against a physician who had failed to diagnose his 
lung cancer.  At the time of the suit, the cancer was in remission after 
aggressive treatment.59  The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the 
worsening of the patient’s condition was a compensable injury be-
cause, during the time the patient’s cancer remained undiagnosed, she 
                                                                                                                           
result from the loss of a substantial opportunity, but noting that the harm, or ultimate outcome, is 
not necessarily the death of the patient but could also be the worsening of the patient’s condition 
before remission).  
 53 DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 139 (Iowa 1986) (allowing recovery for a loss of 
chance even though the ultimate outcome had yet to pass because the patient’s breast cancer 
had spread to her bones and had become incurable); Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 46 (holding that 
plaintiff’s loss of chance action accrued at the time the medical accident occurred because, at that 
moment, the patient’s death had become ineluctable). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008) (where the patient died of 
cancer after his physician failed to timely diagnose his condition). 
 56 Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 281 (Ind. 2000) (where the patient’s condition 
worsened during the time the physician failed to diagnose a lung cancer). 
 57 Harris v. Kissling, 721 P.2d 838, 839-40 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (where the hospital’s failure to 
inoculate the patient deprived her of a chance to have future healthy children). 
 58 Alexander, 726 N.E.2d at 272. 
 59 Id. at 273. 
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suffered the destruction of healthy lung tissue, the growth of a cancer-
ous tumor, and the collapse of a lung.60   
In DeBurkarte v. Louvar,61 where the plaintiff’s physician failed to 
timely diagnose breast lumps as cancerous resulting in the loss of any 
chance of survival, the Supreme Court of Iowa recognized that past 
and future pain and suffering included not only physical pain but also 
mental anguish because the patient “knew her cancer was incurable 
and her days were numbered.”62  The Court also found that the pa-
tient’s husband was entitled to recovery for lost consortium.63  The 
Court, however, found that the plaintiff had failed to produce substan-
tial evidence on the shortening of her life, which did not prevent re-
covery for her loss of chance.64  By finding that the plaintiff had a 
claim for loss of chance independent of a claim for the shortening of 
her life, the Court’s holding supports the argument that the two inju-
ries were distinct.  
Once the injury is established, the plaintiff must prove the second 
element of negligence, i.e., that the physician breached a duty of care.   
2. The Breach of a Duty of Care 
The defendant must conform to a standard of care.  Typical ex-
amples of breach include the late or lack of diagnosis of a medical 
condition65 or delayed treatment.66   
The defendant may not be the only person who breached a duty 
of care.  There might be several tortfeasors who contributed jointly 
and severally to the loss of chance, or several tortfeasors who each 
contributed to a distinct loss of a percentage of chance.  For example, 
tortfeasor A may cause the loss of 10% of chance, and tortfeasor B 
may cause the loss of another 10% of chance, or tortfeasors A and B 
jointly may cause the loss of 20% of chance.67  In fact, plaintiffs in loss 
of chance cases routinely sue multiple defendants.68  As the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey emphasized in Scafidi v. Seiler,69 the theory of loss 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 281. 
 61 DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986). 
 62 Id. at 139. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 135. 
 65 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.1983) (late 
diagnosis of lung cancer); DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 139 (late diagnosis of breast cancer). 
 66 Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1993) (delayed treatment upon 
arrival in the emergency room). 
 67 See, e.g., Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 44 (1990) (where plaintiff sued her physi-
cian, the hospital, and the Nurse anesthetist was named a third-party defendant). 
 68 See id. 
 69 Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 (1990). 
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of chance is consistent with the principles of comparative negligence 
as well as the principles of joint-tortfeasor contribution.70  
Once both the injury and the breach of a duty of care are estab-
lished, the plaintiff must prove the last element of negligence, i.e., cau-
sation.   
3. The Causation 
The theory of loss of chance, as a theory of injury, is consistent 
with the traditional notion of causation.  To have a claim for loss of 
chance, the plaintiff must prove that the tortfeasor’s negligence caused 
the plaintiff’s injury, where the plaintiff’s injury consists of the dimin-
ished likelihood of achieving a favorable outcome.71  
Causation consists of two elements: causation in fact and legal 
causation.72  Causation in fact is the application of the “but for” rule.  
There is causation if the event would not have occurred but for the 
defendant’s conduct.73  Generally, causation in fact is an issue for the 
jury.74  The issue of causation in fact only becomes a question of law 
for the court if the plaintiff presented no evidence from which the jury 
could reasonably find a causal nexus between the negligent act and 
the resulting injury.75   
Legal causation, or proximate cause, determines whether legal li-
ability should be imposed as a matter of law where causation in fact is 
established.76  It generally depends upon considerations of common 
sense and policy.77  To be the cause of an injury, the negligent act must 
occur through “a natural and continuous sequence of events that is 
unbroken by any effective intervening cause.’78  If the chain of causa-
tion is broken, the tortfeasor is relieved from liability.79 
B. The False Barriers to the Application of the Theory 
Although the theory of loss of chance is consistent with all the 
traditional rules of negligence, it does not necessarily appear to be so.  
Some obstacles to the recognition of the theory of loss of chance in-
clude: (1) the argument that an injury only can be compensated if it is 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 408. 
 71 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832 (Mass. 2008). 
 72 Crosby v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (D. Alaska 1999). 
 73 McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 470-71 (Ok. 1987). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 203 (2013). 
 79 Id. 
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certain and not speculative; (2) the apparent impossibility of reconcil-
ing the theory with the traditional notions of causation; (3) the diffi-
culty in proving a loss of chance; (4) the difficulty in assessing the 
amount of the damages; and (5) the creation of a new cause of action 
in the area of medical malpractice.  
1. The Certainty of the Injury 
A plaintiff can recover only for injuries that are certain, not 
speculative.80  The loss of chance, as an injury, is often criticized for 
being no more than a speculative harm.81  The identification of the in-
jury requires the use of statistical evidence.82  It requires making as-
sumptions about what should have been the course of events in the 
absence of the tortious act.  The theory relies on the principle that 
there is an inevitable evolution of the medical condition.  It introduces 
the idea of fate into individual cases and does not take into account 
the potential for the patient’s medical condition to have an unusual 
path. 
Ascertaining the plaintiff’s injury is further complicated by the 
fact that statistical evidence may be used in a number of different 
ways.  For example, when a plaintiff lost his or her chance of survival 
and ultimately died, statistics may give information regarding the 
chance of survival the plaintiff would have had with proper treat-
ment.83  In some instances, when the plaintiff cannot prove that she 
would have survived with proper treatment, she may still use statistics 
on the rate of survival within a specified period of time after the diag-
nosis, e.g., the survival rate for the five years following the diagnosis.84  
This type of evidence is relevant because the shortening of a life gives 
rise to a wrongful death action, and similarly, losing the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Mohr v. Grantham, 262 P.3d 490, 496 (Wash. 2011) (considering the argument that the 
loss of chance is too speculative and holding that this concern is not dissuasive). 
 81 See id. 
 82 Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 475 (Wash. 1983) (using 
statistical evidence to assess the reduction of chances of survival). 
 83 See id. (where the estate proved that the hospital and physician’s negligence proximately 
caused at 14% reduction in his chances of survival). 
 84 In Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital, the plaintiff offered undisputed evidence 
regarding the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics’ five-stage classification 
system for cervical cancer: Cancer diagnosed at “Stage 0” has a 100% five-year survival rate, 
diagnosed at “Stage I” has a 95% survival rate, diagnosed at “Stage II” has a 70% to 80% sur-
vival rate, diagnosed at “Stage III has slightly less than a 50% survival rate, and finally, cancer 
diagnosed at “Stage IV” has only a 0% to 5% survival rate.  Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 
858 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1993). 
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live through a determined period of time gives rise to an action for 
loss of chance of survival.85  
As the Supreme Court of Washington emphasized in Herkovits v. 
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound,86 the statistical data relat-
ing to the extent of the patient’s chance of a better outcome are often 
only considered to evaluate the amount of damages, rather than to 
establish proximate cause.87  The existence of the injury is often readily 
ascertainable by a fact-finder without expert testimony or is not dis-
puted by the parties.88  The disputed issue is the percentage lost. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of sta-
tistics in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum,89 where the defendants urged the 
Court to reject the theory of loss of chance because “a statistical like-
lihood of survival is a ‘mere possibility’ and therefore ‘speculative.’”90  
The Court disagreed with the defendants’ contention by reminding 
them that “the magnitude of a probability is distinct from the degree 
of confidence with which it can be estimated.”91  The Court recognized 
that “[a] statistical survival rate cannot conclusively determine 
whether a particular patient will survive a medical condition.”92  The 
Court, however, stressed that survival rates are not random guesses.93  
Instead, “[t]hey are estimates based on data obtained and analyzed 
scientifically and accepted by the relevant medical community as part 
of the repertoire of diagnosis and treatment, as applied to the specific 
facts of the plaintiff’s case.”94  There is an increasing use of probabilis-
tic evidence in tort cases and, as a result, in medical malpractice cases.  
This type of evidence includes “actuarial tables, assumptions about 
present value and future interest rates, statistical measures of future 
                                                                                                                           
 85 As the Supreme Court of South Dakota stresses,“[I]n all cases death is even more cer-
tain than taxes.  Only the time and cause of death may be in doubt.  If evidence supports a find-
ing that, more probably than not, negligence hastened death, ordinarily a wrongful death action 
lies.  Should an action lie, also, when evidence supports a finding that, more probably than not, 
negligence reduced the patient’s chance of survival?”  Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370 
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 272 (5th 
ed. 1984)).  The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative.  Jorgenson, 616 N.W.2d 
at 371 (“A review of the cases and commentary on the subject persuades us to conclude that a 
loss of chance is an actionable injury in our state.”). 
 86 Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 474. 
 87 Id. at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
 88 Id. at 475. 
 89 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 819 (Mass. 2008). 
 90 Id. at 833. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
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harm, and the like.”95  As the Court pointed out, all these methods of 
valuation are the “stock-in-trade of tort valuation.”96   
Even though statistics have become increasingly reliable, they 
cannot define with absolute certainty what would have been the out-
come of the patient’s condition in the absence of the tortious act.  As a 
result, compensating on the basis of a statistical proposition either will 
overcompensate or undercompensate, depending on how the plain-
tiff’s medical condition would have evolved in the absence of the tor-
tious conduct.97  In that respect, loss of chance cases “elude the degree 
of certainty one would prefer and upon which the law normally insists 
before a person may be held liable.”98 
Allowing recovery for the lost chance, however, is the most equi-
table approach because “[b]ut for the defendant’s tortious conduct, it 
would not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of 
chance.”99  The defendant, having created this uncertainty, should bear 
the burden of possibly overcompensating the patient. 
2. Reconciliation of the Theory with the Traditional Notions of 
Causation 
Some courts interpret the loss of chance as a theory allowing par-
tial compensation for an injury when the causation with respect to the 
tortious act is weak or uncertain.100  The theory of loss of chance, how-
ever, is compatible with and, in fact, requires the application of, the 
“but-for” rule.101  But for the negligence of the physician, the loss of 
chance would not have happened.102  The theory is not an alternative to 
a weak causality with the ultimate outcome.  The loss of chance is a sui 
generis injury, not a fraction of the ultimate outcome.  The traditional 
rules of causation apply. 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. at 841. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 282 (Ind. 2000). 
 98 Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa. 1978). 
 99 DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986). 
 100 See, e.g., Mandros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 310 (R.I. 2008) (holding that the loss of 
chance is an alternative to conventional notions of causation, and requires a more expansive 
interpretation of causation); Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984) 
(finding that the theory is a relaxation of the causation requirement). 
 101 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 843 (Mass. 2008) (holding that a proper in-
struction to the jury must be that but for the negligence of the defendant, the patient lost a fair 
chance of survival). 
 102 See id. 
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3. The Burden of Proof  
In order to prove loss of chance, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving each element of negligence by the preponderance of the evi-
dence.103  The plaintiff must show that the tortfeasor’s negligence 
caused “the plaintiff’s likelihood of achieving a more favorable out-
come to be diminished.”104  In other words, the plaintiff must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that “the physician’s negligence 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, where the injury consists of the dimin-
ished likelihood of achieving a more favorable medical outcome.”105  
Accordingly, a mere possibility of causation will not be enough for the 
plaintiff to meet his or her burden.106  This is where the confusion 
arises.107  In a loss of chance case, the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that the negligence caused the loss of chance, but not that the neg-
ligence caused the final outcome.108  It is possible that the negligence 
caused the final outcome, but this is irrelevant because the plaintiff 
wants to recover for the loss of chance only. 
4. The Evaluation of Damages 
Another obstacle to the theory of loss of chance is that a lost 
chance cannot be quantified.109  A wrongdoer, however, is not relieved 
of the necessity of paying damages merely because damages cannot be 
assessed with certainty.110  In many areas of the law, juries are entrusted 
with the task of awarding damages for injuries that are not readily 
calculable.111  Assessing the value of the loss of chance is not an impos-
sible task.   
                                                                                                                           
 103 Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1284 (holding that, as in many other areas of the law, it is the plain-
tiff’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm suffered was due to the 
conduct of the defendant). 
 104 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984). 
 107 See, e.g., Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 47-48 (1990) (holding that “the more 
probable than not standard, as well as other standards of causation, are analytic devices-tools to 
be used in making causation judgments,” whereas the more probable than not is a burden of 
proof, not a standard of causation). 
 108 King, supra note 20, at 1363 (“A plaintiff ordinarily should be required to prove by the 
applicable standard of proof that the defendant caused the loss in question.”).  
 109 LeBlanc v. Barry, 790 So. 2d 75, 81 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (admitting that a loss of chance 
cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty). 
 110 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (holding 
that “[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of 
damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all 
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer.”). 
 111 Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 283 (Ind. 2000). 
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Generally, the damages are measured with the following method.  
First, the percentages of a chance of a favorable outcome pre-
negligence and post-negligence are assessed.112  Second, the post-
negligence percentage of a favorable outcome is subtracted from pre-
negligence percentage of a favorable outcome.113  The resulting amount 
is the percentage of the chance lost.  Third, this net percentage of 
chance obtained is multiplied by the total amount of damages that 
ordinarily are allowed for the unfavorable outcome.114  This is the 
amount that plaintiff will recover.115  This is the “proportional award 
method.”116  The award is proportional to the value of the ultimate out-
come.117 
In the example presented earlier in this comment, where a pa-
tient had 40% chance of survival and lost 20% chance as a result of 
the negligence, the calculation would be done using the following 
method.  The post-negligence percentage of a favorable outcome, i.e., 
20% is subtracted from pre-negligence percentage of a favorable out-
come, i.e., 40%.  The percentage of chance lost is 20%.  Then, the jury 
will determine the amount of recovery for a wrongful death.  Assum-
ing that the jury estimated this amount to $1 million, this amount shall 
be multiplied with the percentage of chance lost.  The resulting 
amount is $200,000.  This is what the plaintiff or his estate will recover. 
This method of evaluation has been criticized, mostly for rou-
tinely over or undercompensating the patients.118  However, most 
courts have determined that the so-called “proportional award 
method” is the most appropriate method to assess the value of the loss 
of chance for a more favorable outcome because “it is an easily ap-
plied calculation that fairly ensures that a defendant is not assessed 
damages for harm that he did not cause.”119 
The Supreme Court of Michigan adopted “the substantial possi-
bility approach,” which is a variation of the proportional award 
method.120  Under this approach, the plaintiff will recover the same 
amount as under the proportional award method but only if the plain-
tiff can show that the chances lost were substantial.121  If the chances 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Atterholt v. Herbst, 879 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 840 (Mass. 2008). 
 117 Atterholt, 879 N.E.2d at 1226. 
 118 See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
605, 631-633 (2001). 
 119 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 840. 
 120 Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56 (Mich. 1990). 
 121 Id. 
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lost were not substantial, the plaintiff recovers nothing under the loss 
of chance theory.122  In Falcon v. Memorial Hospital,123 the Court re-
fused to state what constitutes a threshold showing of substantial 
chances but it does not have to be more than 50%.124  Even though the 
Court did not clearly explain its rationale,125 a possible explanation 
may be that below a certain threshold, e.g., 1 or 2%, the calculation of 
damages becomes too speculative.  It seems, however, that the Su-
preme Court of Michigan could have framed this threshold require-
ment in terms of causation rather than calculation of damages.  As 
Professor King noted in his seminal article, “[i]t is not uncommon for 
courts to apply the concept of causation to matters of valuation as 
well as causation.”126  Professor King believed that this practice, that he 
refers to as a “melding of concepts,” is more than a “matter of style or 
nomenclature;” it has often affected the courts decisions.127  The Su-
preme Court of Michigan should have found that in absence of evi-
dence of a loss of “substantial chance,” the injury was too speculative 
to trigger the defendant’s liability. 
Alternatively, the evaluation of damages can be left for the jury 
to decide.  In LeBlanc v. Barry,128 the Louisiana Third District Court of 
Appeal recognized that a loss of chance was a “particular cognizable 
loss” that cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty.129  The 
Court held that the fact finder should make a “subjective determina-
tion of the value of that loss.”130  
It should be noted that an author offered yet another way to cal-
culate damages in loss of chance cases.131  In a law review article, Zaven 
T. Saroyan advocated a new approach to damages: the relative propor-
tionality approach.132  The author rejected the proportional approach 
because of its “unfairness” in calculating damages.133  The author criti-
cized the fact that the traditional approach only takes into account the 
absolute percentage of the chances lost, and not the proportion of 
chances that have been affected by the defendant’s tortious conduct.134  
Going to the example used earlier, where the patient had a 40% 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 44. 
 124 Id. at 56-57 (holding that a 37.5% chance of survival was substantial). 
 125 Id. 
 126 King, supra note 20, at 1355. 
 127 Id. 
 128 LeBlanc v. Barry, 790 So. 2d 75, 81 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Saroyan, supra note 12, at 15. 
 132 Id. at 16-17. 
 133 Id. at 36. 
 134 Id. at 38. 
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chance of survival and lost 20% due to the defendant’s negligence, the 
proportional approach will take into account the loss of 20% chance, 
whereas the relative proportionality approach will take into account 
the percentage of chance lost relative to the percentage of chance the 
patient initially had, i.e., 50%.  The author proposed the following 
formula: (.5) x [(the proportion of loss) x (the remaining value of the 
injured person’s life)].135  The author assumed that plaintiffs who lost 
more than 50% chance of recovery will be able to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant, more likely than not, 
caused the unfavorable outcome.136  Since the patient losing more than 
50% chance will be compensated for the value of the unfavorable out-
come, the author arbitrarily assigned a multiplier of .5 to calculate the 
damages of those who lost less than 50% chance of chances.137   
In the example used earlier, the patient had a 40% chance of sur-
vival and lost 20% of it as a result of the negligence of the defendant.  
The damages for death are valued at $1 million.  Under the propor-
tional approach, the patient would recover 20% of 1 million, i.e., 
$200,000.  Under the relative proportionality approach, the patient 
would recover $250,000: .5 x 50% x $1 million.   
This approach is interesting but not compelling.138  It offers the 
advantage of deterring tortious conduct even when a patient had very 
few chances of a favorable outcome to begin with.  For example, a 
plaintiff who had a 2% chance of survival and lost 2% of it will re-
cover $500,000 under the relative proportionality approach instead of 
$20,000 under the proportional approach. The multiplier .5, however, 
is arbitrary.  Additionally, it tends to both overcompensate and under-
compensate a plaintiff.  A plaintiff who had few chances of a favorable 
outcome and lost them all will be overcompensated, while a plaintiff 
who had initially a lot of chance but lost a small percentage relative to 
his initial chance will be undercompensated.  For example, under the 
relative proportionality approach, a plaintiff who had 3% chance of 
survival and lost only 2% of it will recover $333,300, while a plaintiff 
who had a 30% chance of survival and lost 10% of it will only recover 
$166,650.  To this day, no court has endorsed this theory.139   
                                                                                                                           
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 37-38. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Brief for Virginia P. Foley, Appellant, Foley v. St. Joseph Health Servs. of R.I., 899 A.2d 
1271 (R.I. 2006) (No. 05-90 ), 2005 WL 5903753, at *23 (finding the theory uncompelling). 
 139 Some litigants have mentioned the theory but to dismiss it.  Id.; Foley v. St. Joseph 
Health Servs. of R.I., 899 A.2d 1271, 1281 (R.I. 2006) (affirming judgment as a matter of law 
against the plaintiff). 
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Finally, the calculation of damages for loss of chance does not ex-
clude the availability of punitive damages.140  As the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts pointed out in Matsuyama, “[w]here gross negligence is 
found in a loss of chance case, the fact finder will determine an 
amount of punitive damages exactly as in any other gross negligence 
case: according to the fact finder’s determination of the egregiousness 
of the tortious conduct or in accordance with any statutorily pre-
scribed amount.”141 
5. Tort Reform Considerations   
Another criticism of the theory is that it creates a new cause of 
action in medical malpractice, an area that already is plagued with an 
unsustainable degree of litigation.142  The American Medical Associa-
tion estimates the annual cost of defensive medicine to be over $200 
billion in healthcare costs.143  Since the mid-1970s, in the wake of rising 
premiums and a reduction in the number of firms offering coverage to 
health care providers, many states adopted new regulations to reduce 
medical tort litigation.144  These reforms have included damage caps on 
economic and non-economic damages, limitation on joint and several 
liability of health care providers, statutory caps on attorney’s fees, as 
well as offset rules that reduce the award by the amount the plaintiff 
will receive from other sources.145  The recognition of the theory of loss 
of chance, therefore, seems to go against the tide of the states’ contin-
ued efforts to reduce medical malpractice litigation.  
The theory was born in the United States out of the dissatisfac-
tion with the “all or nothing” rule of tort.146  According to this rule, a 
plaintiff who is able to prove that the defendant’s negligence more 
likely than not caused the ultimate outcome will recover damages for 
the ultimate outcome.147  On the contrary, the plaintiff who is not able 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 847 n.61 (Mass. 2008) (“Our decision today 
should not be construed to suggest that a finding of gross negligence and an award of punitive 
damages cannot be secured in a loss of chance case.”) 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Bernie Monegain, AMA Asserts Insurers Waste $200 Billion a Year on Inefficiencies, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (July 21, 2009), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/ama-
asserts-insurers-waste-200-billion-year-inefficiencies. 
 143 See Philip K. Howard, Why Medical Malpractice Is Off Limits, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574432853190155972.html; see 
also Monegain, supra note 142.  
 144 Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact of 
State Tort Reform, HEALTH AFF. (Jan. 21, 2004), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/suppl/2004/01/21/hlthaff.w4.20v1.DC1. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 829-30. 
 147 Id. 
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to prove that the defendant’s negligence more likely than not caused 
the ultimate outcome will recover nothing.148  Thus, courts often have 
held that when tortious conduct caused a plaintiff to lose 51% chance 
of a favorable outcome, this plaintiff could recover the damages 
equivalent to the entire outcome.149  In contrast, if the plaintiff had lost 
only 49% chance of a favorable outcome, he would recover nothing.150  
The “all or nothing” rule precludes recovery for the loss of chance and 
overcompensates the victim who lost 51% or more chance of a better 
outcome.   
The loss of chance theory, on the other hand, allows recovery for 
the loss of chance but it also extinguishes the possibility of recovery 
for the final outcome.151  In our prior example, the patient had 40% 
chance of recovery.  Let us assume that he had a 51% chance of sur-
vival instead and that the negligence caused this chance to be lost.  
Under the traditional rule of tort, the patient will be able to prove that 
the negligence, more likely than not, caused the final outcome.  Ac-
cordingly, the patient will recover the full amount, i.e., $1 million.  Un-
der the theory of loss of chance, however, assuming that the propor-
tional award method applies, the plaintiff would recover only for the 
51% chance lost.  Accordingly, his award will be limited to $510,000.  
There, in the situations where the patients had more than an even 
chance of a better outcome, the theory of loss of chance limits the 
amount of the award available.  In Scafidi v. Seiler, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey remanded a case for new trial because the jury received 
no instruction regarding the fact that plaintiffs’ damages should have 
been limited to the value of the lost chance for recovery attributable 
to defendant’s negligence.152 
The theory of loss of chance also fulfills a very important objec-
tive of negligence law: deterring wrongful actions that have caused 
harm.  Otherwise, the “all or nothing” rule provides a “blanket release 
from liability” for doctors and hospitals any time there is less than a 
50% chance of survival, “regardless of how flagrant the negligence.”153  
Despite these arguments, legislatures have on two occasions en-
acted statutes specifically repudiating state supreme court decisions 
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 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 838-41 (compensating the plaintiff for the loss of chance and not the death). 
 152 Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 406-07 (N.J. 1990). 
 153 Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983). 
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allowing recovery for a loss of chance.  This happened in Michigan154 
and in South Dakota.155 
The theory of loss of chance, nonetheless, slowly has gained ac-
ceptance, even though the states remain divided on the issue. 
II. AN UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION AMONG THE FIFTY STATES 
Despite a heterogeneous implementation of the theory, several 
trends can be identified in the United States.156  In some instances, the 
courts have distorted the traditional principles of tort law.157   
A. The Trends Across the United States 
Three trends can be identified across the United States.158    Some 
states deny recovery for the loss of chance, which is the “traditional 
approach.”159  Some states refuse to recognize the theory and instead 
indemnify the loss of the favorable outcome through the use of a re-
laxed causation requirement, which is the “relaxed causation ap-
proach.”160  Some states endorse the theory, which is the “proportional 
approach.”161  There are, however, a few states that have yet to address 
the theory of loss of chance.162 
                                                                                                                           
 154 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912a (2012) (repudiating O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. 
Ctr., 791 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Mich. 2010)). 
 155 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (2012) (repudiating Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366 
(S.D. 2000)).  
 156 SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 272-73. 
 157 See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 
Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits, 664 
P.2d at 474. 
 158 SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 272-73. 
 159 See, e.g., United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Del. 1994) (holding that the 
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 160 See, e.g., Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1100 (holding that the second approach, the “relaxed 
causation approach,” is to adopt the theory as an exception to traditional causation standards); 
see also Peterson, 951 A.2d at 609; Contois, 865 A.2d at 1023.   
 161 See, e.g., Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1100 (holding that the third approach, the “propor-
tional approach,” is to adopt the theory as a method of compensating the lost chance of survival, 
rather than the death itself); see also Peterson, 951 A.2d at 609; Contois, 865 A.2d at 1023. 
 162 For example, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah and Rhode Island have yet to address the 
theory.   
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1. The Adoption of the Theory 
A minority of the states has adopted the theory of loss of chance, 
including Arizona,163 Colorado,164 Delaware,165 Georgia,166 Hawaii,167 Illi-
nois,168 Indiana,169 Iowa,170 Louisiana,171 Massachusetts,172 Missouri,173 
Montana,174 Nevada,175 New Jersey,176 New Mexico,177 New York,178 
Ohio,179 Virginia,180 West Virginia,181 Wisconsin,182 and Wyoming.183 
Delaware has adopted the theory but through a tortuous path.  
First, in United States v. Cumberbatch,184 where the family of a patient 
who died from pneumococcal meningitis sued to recover under the 
state wrongful death statute, the Supreme Court of Delaware held 
that the theory of loss of chance was incompatible with the wrongful 
death statute because the statute created a cause of action only when 
the negligence caused the death.185  This holding is consistent with the 
argument that a tortfeasor who only caused a loss of chance cannot be 
liable for the ultimate outcome.  Soon after Cumberbatch, the Su-
preme Court of Delaware was faced with the issue of increased risk of 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 616 (Ariz. 1984) (finding that a 
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harm.186  In United States v. Anderson,187 the late diagnosis of testicular 
cancer had exposed the patient to a risk of recurrence of this cancer, a 
risk that would have been avoided with a timely diagnosis.188  The Su-
preme Court of Delaware held that the “loss of chance and increased 
risk of harm both rely on similar theoretical underpinnings,” con-
cluded it was necessary to consider them together, and recognized 
they were recoverable injuries.189   
2. The Rejection of the Theory 
Most states and the District of Columbia190 have chosen the “all or 
nothing approach.”  They include Alabama,191 Alaska,192 Arkansas,193 
California,194 Connecticut,195 Florida,196 Idaho,197 Kentucky,198 Maryland,199 
Michigan,200 Minnesota,201 Mississippi,202 Nebraska,203 North Carolina,204 
New Hampshire,205 Oregon,206 South Carolina,207 South Dakota,208 Ten-
nessee,209 Texas,210 and Vermont.211   
Connecticut seems to allow recovery for loss of chance, but in fact 
requires that the plaintiff originally have more than a fifty percent 
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chance of a favorable outcome.212  In Boone v. William W. Backus Hos-
pital, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that “it is not sufficient 
for a lost chance plaintiff to prove merely that a defendant’s negligent 
conduct has deprived him or her of some chance; in Connecticut, such 
plaintiff must prove that the negligent conduct more likely than not 
affected the actual outcome.”213   
Mississippi follows a similar approach.  In Ladner v. Campbell,214 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that “Mississippi law does not 
permit recovery of damages because of mere diminishment of the 
‘chance of recovery.’”215  Instead, the Court added, “[r]ecovery is al-
lowed only when the failure of the physician to render the required 
level of care results in the loss of a reasonable probability of substan-
tial improvement of the plaintiff’s condition.”216  In Phillips v. Eastern 
Maine Medical Center,217 where a personal representative of the estate 
of a deceased patient of a hospital filed a medical malpractice action 
against the hospital for failure to detect and repair an esophageal tear, 
the Supreme Court of Maine recognized that some jurisdictions re-
quire the plaintiff to show a better than even chance of avoiding harm 
in the absence of medical negligence and some do not.218  The Court 
concluded that the plaintiff had proven that without the defendant’s 
negligence the patient would have had a better than even chance of 
survival.219  Therefore, the plaintiff satisfied the more stringent re-
quirement, and the Court did not rule on whether a less than even 
chance would be a cognizable claim under Maine common law.220   
In North Carolina, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
issue of loss of chance, but the Court of Appeals recognized a claim 
for loss of chance, as long as the patient would have had a better than 
51% chance of a favorable outcome.221 
Michigan adopted the theory of loss of chance but for only a brief 
period of time.  In 1990, in Falcon v. Memorial Hospital, the Supreme 
Court recognized that “the loss of opportunity of avoiding physical 
harm” is a compensable injury.222  In Falcon, a nineteen year-old 
woman suffered a complete respiratory and cardiac collapse moments 
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after delivering a healthy baby and suddenly died.223  The autopsy re-
port confirmed that an amniotic fluid embolism had caused the 
death.224  The health care providers attending the patient had failed to 
insert, before the delivery, an intravenous line, which could have been 
used to infuse life-saving fluids into the patient’s circulatory system.225  
As a result, the patient lost a 37.5% opportunity of surviving.226  The 
Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged that the question whether 
the defendants had caused the death could not be readily answered,227 
but also that the defendant had created this uncertainty.  The Supreme 
Court reasoned: 
Had the defendants in the instant case inserted an intravenous 
line, one of two things would have happened, Nena Falcon would 
have lived, or she would have died.  There would be no uncer-
tainty whether the omissions of the defendants caused her death.  
Falcon’s destiny would have been decided by fate and not possi-
bly by her health care providers. 228 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that by reducing the patient’s op-
portunity of living, the defendants caused harm to the patient, al-
though it could not have been said with certainty that the defendants 
caused the patient’s death.229  This harm should subject the defendants 
to liability.230 
Three years later, the Michigan Legislature amended its medical 
malpractice statute to repudiate Falcon and prohibit the recovery of 
“a loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a 
better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%.”231  In 1997, 
in Weymers v. Khera,232 the Supreme Court of Michigan had to rule on 
a medical malpractice case that had accrued before the effective date 
of the statute.233  The plaintiff presented evidence that the defendants’ 
negligence caused her to lose a 30 to 40% chance to retain the func-
tioning of her kidneys.234  The Supreme Court held235 that Falcon had 
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recognized that only a loss of chance of survival was a compensable 
injury.236  Accordingly, the Court refused to extend Falcon to a loss of 
chance to achieve a better result and reasoned that no cause of action 
existed for the loss of an opportunity to avoid physical harm less than 
death.237  Later on, applying the statute, the Michigan Supreme Court 
systemically rejected loss of chance claims, compensating only patients 
that could prove that the defendant, more likely than not, caused the 
patient’s injury.238 
South Dakota followed the same path.  In 2000, the South Da-
kota Supreme Court held, in Jorgenson v. Vener,239 that the loss of 
chance doctrine was recognized at common law in that state.240  In 
Jorgenson, contrary to Falcon, the plaintiff sued not for a loss of 
chance of survival, but for the loss of chance of a better outcome.241  
The plaintiff had injured his leg and alleged that his physician, by fail-
ing to diagnose a chronic infection, had caused him to lose a chance to 
save his limb.242  The Supreme Court of South Dakota, after reviewing 
the pros and cons of the theory, held that a loss of chance was an ac-
tionable injury.243  The adoption of the loss of chance doctrine, wrote 
Chief Justice Miller on behalf of the court, “properly balances the 
competing concerns of a patient who receives negligent treatment, 
against those of the doctor who practices in the inherently inexact 
science of medicine.”244 
Following Jorgenson, the legislature expressly abrogated 
Jorgenson because the legislature found that the theory improperly 
altered or eliminated the requirement of proximate causation.245  Ac-
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cordingly, the courts of South Dakota subsequently rejected claims 
based on the theory of loss of chance.246 
The arguments supporting the rejection of the theory are not al-
ways convincing though.  In Gooding v. University Hospital Building 
Inc.,247 the Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question 
of “whether a theory of recovery for loss of a chance to survive predi-
cated upon alleged medical malpractice is actionable in Florida.”248  
The court rejected the theory and refused to allow recovery for a loss 
of less than even chances of a favorable outcome.249  The court held 
that relaxing the causation requirement could create an injustice.250  
The court further explained that “[h]ealth care providers could find 
themselves defending cases simply because a patient fails to improve 
or where serious disease processes are not arrested because another 
course of action could possibly bring a better result.”251  This argument 
is a distorted view of the theory of loss of chance.  The theory only 
requires that healthcare providers be answerable for a patient’s loss of 
chance of recovery caused by their negligence.  The theory does not 
create a heightened duty to cure or save patients.   
3. The Distortion of the Theory Through the Use of a Relaxed 
Causation Requirement 
Some states, including Kansas,252 Oklahoma,253 Pennsylvania,254 and 
Washington,255 have adopted the theory of loss of chance, but with the 
qualifier that the theory is a relaxation of the traditional causation 
requirement.  The Supreme Court of Kansas held that “the loss of 
chance of recovery theory basically entails the adoption of a different 
standard of causation than usually applies in negligence cases.”256  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the theory of loss 
of chance was developed to “relax the standard for sufficiency of 
proof of causation ordinarily required of a plaintiff.”257 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See, e.g., Smith v. Bubak, 643 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 2011) (excluding expert testi-
mony showing that the plaintiff had approximately a fifty-eight percent chance of at least a 
partial recovery because the testimony had become irrelevant under South Dakota’s proximate 
cause statute, and thus was not admissible). 
 247 Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984). 
 248 Id. at 1017. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 1019. 
 251 Id. at 1019-20. 
 252 See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 183 (Kan. 1994). 
 253 See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 469 (Okla. 1987). 
 254 See Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978). 
 255 See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Wash. 1983). 
 256 Delaney, 873 P.2d at 182. 
 257 McKellips, 741 P.2d at 471. 
616 FIU Law Review [8:591 
By asserting that the theory is a relaxation of the traditional cau-
sation requirement, these courts suggest that there should be a causal 
link, even weak, between the wrongful act and the ultimate outcome.  
This should not be the case.  The injury at issue is the loss of chance 
and, therefore, the inquiry into whether there is causation between the 
wrongful act and the ultimate outcome is irrelevant.258 
4. The States That Have Yet to Address the Theory of Loss of 
Chance 
The states of North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah have yet to ad-
dress the theory of loss of chance.  In Joshi v. Providence Health Sys-
tem of Oregon Corporation,259 the Supreme Court of Oregon declared 
that loss of chance claims are incompatible with the Oregon wrongful 
death statute.260  This decision is, therefore, similar to the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Delaware in Cumberbatch.261  It recognizes that 
a tortfeasor who only caused a loss of chance cannot be liable for the 
ultimate outcome.262  It does not indicate, however, how the Supreme 
Court of Oregon would rule on a claim seeking only the recovery of a 
loss of chance. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has not addressed directly 
the issue of a loss of chance.  In Seale v. Gowans,263 where the defen-
dants had failed to diagnose the patient’s breast cancer, the plaintiff 
appealed a directed verdict in favor of the defendants, who had suc-
cessfully argued that the action was time-barred.  The Supreme Court 
of Utah held that a decrease in a patient’s chance of survival, without 
proof of actual damages, was not adequate to sustain a cause of action 
for negligence damages.264  By this statement, the Court meant that the 
decrease of the patient’s chance of survival did not trigger the running 
of the statute of limitations.  The Court did not recognize or reject the 
theory of loss of chance. 
Finally, in Rhode Island, the Supreme Court declined to adopt or 
reject the theory.265  The Supreme Court did not deem the facts in pre-
vious Rhode Island cases to be appropriate for the application of the 
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loss of chance doctrine, but acknowledged that the theory could be 
revisited under the appropriate fact scenario.266   
B. Towards Better Practices 
While many state courts apply the loss of chance theory correctly, 
many others have relied on arguments that reveal either a misunder-
standing of the theory or a distortion of the traditional principles of 
tort.  It is important to (1) maintain the well-established principles of 
negligence and (2) avoid arbitrary distinctions between the patients 
who have more than even chances and patients who have less than 
even chances of a favorable outcome.  
1. The Importance of Maintaining the Well-Established Princi-
ples of Negligence 
There is a contradiction between: (1) relaxing the requirements of 
causation between the wrongful act and the unfavorable outcome; and 
(2) indemnifying the loss of chance not the unfavorable outcome.  It 
violates two basic principles of negligence: the requirement of proof of 
causation and the plaintiff’s entitlement to a full recovery.267 
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, an es-
tate sued a hospital and a physician for failure to timely diagnose the 
decedent’s lung cancer on his first visit to the hospital.268  The estate 
proved that the hospital’s and physician’s negligence proximately 
caused a 14% reduction in the decedent’s chances of survival.269  The 
Supreme Court of Washington held en banc that a patient with less 
than a 50% chance of survival could recover under the wrongful death 
statute because a reduction of chance of survival from 39 to 25% is 
sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the 
jury.270   
This approach is problematic because the court recognized that 
the defendants were liable only for a loss of chance and not for the 
death of the plaintiff, yet the defendants were held accountable under 
the wrongful death statute.271  Pursuant to the Washington statute, 
“[w]hen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or 
default of another his or her personal representative may maintain an 
action for damages against the person causing the death; and although 
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the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount, 
in law, to a felony.”272 
In his concurrence, Justice Pearson stated: 
The wrongful death statute is probably the principal reason the 
parties focused on the death of Mr. Herskovits rather than his 
diminished chance of survival.  As I have endeavored to demon-
strate, this approach leads either to harsh and arbitrary results, or 
to distortions of existing tort principles and the potential for con-
fusion.  A liberal construction of the statute appears a more ef-
fective method of achieving the most desirable end.  The word 
“cause” has a notoriously elusive meaning (as the writings on le-
gal causation all agree) and it is certainly sufficiently flexible to 
bear the interpretation I give it in the context of [the wrongful 
death statute]. 273 
This interpretation reveals that the court relaxed the causation 
standard, thus deviating from the traditional notions of tort.  This 
analysis suggests that when the plaintiff has met his burden of proving 
proximate cause with respect to the loss of chance, the plaintiff has 
somewhat also met his burden of proving proximate cause with re-
spect to the death of the patient.   
Further, by allowing the case to go to the jury, the Washington 
Supreme Court entrusted the trier of fact with the difficult task of 
assessing the damages for the loss of chance.  Traditionally, damages 
awards consist of a single lump sum that is intended to fully compen-
sate the plaintiff for all past and future consequences of the tort.274  In 
this case, if the jury awards damages for the wrongful death, the de-
fendants will be liable for damages they did not cause.  On the other 
hand, if the jury awards damages for the loss of chance, the defendants 
will be liable for the damages they caused but the plaintiff will not 
recover fully for the wrongful death, as per the statute. 
Relaxing the causation requirement and indemnifying the loss of 
chance instead of the ultimate outcome is a convoluted way of recog-
nizing the theory.  This method does not comport with the traditional 
rules of negligence.  Departing from well-established principles of 
torts is a dangerous path that could be avoided easily by simply rec-
ognizing that the loss of chance is a type of injury.   
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2. The Arbitrary Distinction Between More Than Even Chances 
and Less Than Even Chances of a Favorable Outcome 
Many courts, whether they recognize the theory of loss of chance 
or reject it, recognize that a plaintiff has a cause of action only if the 
chances he lost were more than even.275   
This distinction is arbitrary.  As the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts noted in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, “[w]here credible evidence 
establishes that the plaintiff’s or decedent’s probability of survival is 
49%, that conclusion is no more speculative than a conclusion, based 
on similarly credible evidence, that the probability of survival is 
51%.”276   
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized the perverse practical ef-
fect of the distinction in Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital: 
It puts a premium on each party’s search for the willing witness.  
Human nature being what it is, and the difference between scien-
tific and legal tests for “probability” often creating confusion, for 
every expert witness who evaluates the lost chance at 49% there 
is another who estimates it at closer to 51%.  Also, the rule tends 
to defeat one of the primary functions of the tort system – deter-
rence of negligent conduct because cases based on statistical pos-
sibilities the rule prevents any individual in a group from recov-
ering, even though it may be statistically irrefutable that some 
have been injured.277 
The Supreme Court of Kansas also acknowledged that there are 
sound reasons of public policy for not drawing a distinction between 
the more than even and the less than even chances of recovery.278  The 
court explained that the distinction, in essence, “declares open season 
on critically ill or injured persons as care providers would be free of 
liability for even the grossest malpractice if the patient had only a 
fifty-fifty chance [or less] of surviving the disease or injury even with 
proper treatment.”279  Accordingly, the segment of society often least 
able to exercise independent judgment is at the mercy of those profes-
sionals who provide them with life-saving health care.280  Patients with 
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poor prospects of recovery or survival are the most in need of protec-
tion against medical malpractice.   
This distinction may be drawn because courts routinely confuse 
causation and the burden of proof required to show causation.281  The 
plaintiff must prove causation by preponderance of the evidence: the 
defendant’s conduct, more likely than not, must have caused the in-
jury.282  In many of the loss of chances cases, however, the fact that the 
defendant caused a loss of chance is not even at issue nor is the 
amount of chance lost.283  In those cases, the plaintiff proved the loss of 
chance to a certainty.284  Whether the percentage of chances lost is 
above or below 50%, therefore, should not matter.  In fact, when a 
plaintiff proves to a certainty that the tortfeasor caused the plaintiff to 
lose 51% of the chance of survival, the plaintiff actually showed to a 
certainty that the causation in fact, i.e., the causal link between the 
tortfeasor and the unfavorable outcome, cannot be proven.  The Su-
preme Court of Michigan demonstrated this idea through the follow-
ing examples: 
To say that a patient would have had a ninety-nine percent op-
portunity of survival if given proper treatment, does not mean 
that the physician’s negligence was the cause in fact if the patient 
would have been among the unfortunate one percent who would 
have died. A physician’s carelessness may, similarly, be the actual 
cause of physical harm although the patient had only a one per-
cent opportunity of surviving even with flawless medical atten-
tion. 285 
The source of the confusion between burden of proof and per-
centage of chance may come from the fact that, in the United States, 
the burden of proof is probabilistic and thus is explained in terms of 
percentage.286  The burden of proof for civil cases, the preponderance 
of the evidence, requires that more than 50% of the evidence points to 
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plaintiff’s allegations.287  This is a low threshold.  In civil law countries, 
the threshold is often much higher and requires that a plaintiff prove 
the truth of his or her allegations.288  A civil law plaintiff must prove 
each element of a claim to a certainty.289  Accordingly, in a civil law 
country, a loss of chance, whether greater or lesser than 50%, can 
never give rise to a cause of action for the compensation of the ulti-
mate outcome.  The theory of loss of chance, therefore, comes to fill 
the gap and indemnify the loss of a favorable outcome.  In the United 
States, on the contrary, the theory of loss of chance interferes with the 
probabilistic approach to causation.290  In cases where the plaintiff lost 
more than 50% chance of a favorable outcome, the theory of loss of 
chance allows the plaintiff to recover damages for the loss of chance, 
whereas the probabilistic approach to causation allows the plaintiff to 
recover damages for the ultimate outcome, not just the loss of chance.  
The stark contrast between civil and common law countries may ex-
plain the U.S. courts’ reticence to adopt the theory and the persisting 
confusion surrounding its application. 
3. The Legislative Option 
Considering the obstacles to the implementation of the theory of 
loss of chance, the most appropriate way to recognize or reject the 
theory may be through the enactment of a statute.  So far, state legisla-
tures have intervened only to reject the theory of loss of chance once 
courts had recognized its application.291  In none of the fifty states has 
a legislature taken the initiative to enact a statute expressly allowing 
recovery for loss of chance.  Implementing the theory through legisla-
tion, however, may be a more democratic and systematic way of rec-
ognizing it.  A public debate involving all the actors affected by the 
proposed legislation would be beneficial both to determining the fi-
nancial implications of implementing the theory and to evaluating the 
constituents’ positions on the issue.  The legislature could consider 
imposing limits to the application of the theory, i.e., prohibiting puni-
tive damages, defining the method of evaluation of the injury, and de-
ciding if the injury of loss of chance should be indemnified when the 
ultimate outcome is certain but has not yet come to pass.   
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More importantly, legislatures would have the opportunity of 
considering whether the loss of chance should be limited to the medi-
cal malpractice area and why it should be so.  Many jurisdictions have 
expressed why the loss of chance is particularly suited to the medical 
malpractice area.  In Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc.,292 
the Ohio Supreme Court explained: 
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in mal-
practice cases where physical well being, and life itself, are the 
subject of litigation.  The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends 
to emotionally direct us toward a conclusion that in an action for 
wrongful death an injured person should be compensated for the 
loss of any chance for survival, regardless of its remoteness. 293 
In Matsuyama, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts recognized 
that medical malpractice cases are “particularly well suited” to appli-
cation of the loss of chance theory for several reasons.294  First, reliable 
expert evidence documenting situations of loss of chance are more 
likely to occur in the area of medical malpractice than in other areas 
of negligence.295  Second, in a doctor-patient relationship, there is an 
expectation that “the physician will take every reasonable measure to 
obtain an optimal outcome for the patient.”296  Third, many patients 
find themselves in a situation where they have a less than even chance 
of survival or of achieving a better outcome at the time of diagnosis, 
and therefore are faced with the shortcomings of the all or nothing 
rule.297  Finally, “failure to recognize loss of chance in medical malprac-
tice actions forces the party who is the least capable of preventing the 
                                                                                                                           
 292 Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), overruled by 
Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996). 
 293 Id. at 103-04 (holding that a plaintiff could maintain action for loss of less than even 
chance of recovery or survival by presenting expert medical testimony showing that health care 
provider’s negligent act or omission increased risk of harm to plaintiff); see also Herskovits v. 
Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 491 (Wash. 1983) (Dolliver, J., dissenting). 
 294 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 834-35 (Mass. 2008).  The court relied on Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 26 comment that addressed the theory 
of loss of chance.  Current versions of the third restatement do not address the theory. 
 295 Id.; see also Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 371 (S.D. 2000) (citing King, supra note 
20, at 1386 n.111) (“The fact that the doctrine has thus far only been applied in a medical mal-
practice context in all likelihood derives from the availability of statistical probabilities in the 
field of medical science; such information is not widely available in other malpractice contexts.”). 
 296 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 835 (quoting K.S. ABRAHAM, FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF 
TORT LAW 117–18 (3d ed. 2007) (arguing that “health care providers undertake to maximize a 
patient’s chances of survival, [and so] their failure to do so should be actionable.  Ordinary actors 
who negligently risk causing harm have not undertaken such a duty”)). 
 297 Id. 
2013] The Theory of Loss of Chance 623 
harm to bear the consequences of the more capable party’s negli-
gence.”298  
Very few courts, however, have addressed the issue of loss of 
chance in other contexts.299  In Doll v. Brown,300 a federal employee 
brought action under the Rehabilitation Act alleging that he was dis-
criminated against by reason of a medical condition.301  The complica-
tions of his throat cancer prevented him temporarily from working 
around heavy dust.302  Over time, although he had recovered his ability 
to work around heavy dust, his superiors refused to reinstate him to 
his prior position.303  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the theory of loss of chance is “peculiarly ap-
propriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion,”304 
but denied to hold that the theory was applicable to the case because 
the issue had not been briefed by the parties.305   
In Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc.,306 the widow of a sea-
man sued a vessel owner and the vessel because the master of the ves-
sel made no attempt to search the sea to rescue the seaman in the 
hours after the seaman was reported missing.307  The parties presented 
evidence that if the seaman had gone overboard not long before he 
was reported missing, a search would have had a “reasonable expecta-
tion of success.”308  In other words, because there was some range of 
time and distance in which rescue would have been possible if at-
tempted, the inaction of the master of the vessel caused the seaman to 
lose a chance of being rescued.309  The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia rendered a judgment for the defen-
dants.310  On appeal, the representative of the vessel argued that the 
plaintiff had not proved proximate cause, since the plaintiff could not 
definitely show that the seaman was alive when he went missing and 
could have been saved.311   
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court 
judgment and held that the defendants were liable for the loss of the 
seaman.312  The court found that under the universal custom of the sea, 
as well as under the seaman’s contract, the master had an obligation to 
search in good faith for the lost crew member.313  The court further 
determined that this duty was “of such nature that its omission will 
contribute to cause the seaman’s death.”314  The court, therefore, did 
not frame the issue in terms of loss of chance but in terms of contribu-
tory negligence.315  In Hicks, however, where the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals addressed the theory of chance for the first time,316 the 
court referred to the Gardner case to support its argument that a 
plaintiff cannot be required to prove to an “absolute certainty what 
would have happened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not 
allow to come to pass.”317 
Arguably, the idea of loss of chance, or rather loss of opportunity, 
has been addressed in a few instances in the area of contracts.318  For 
example, in Miller v. Allstate Insurance,319 an insurer breached a prom-
ise to return a wrecked automobile, which the insured needed as evi-
dence in a planned products liability suit against a manufacturer.320  
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal held that the insured could 
recover against the insurer for the lost chance of winning the product 
liability case.321  The court found that it is now an “accepted principle 
of contract law . . . that recovery will be allowed where a plaintiff has 
been deprived of an opportunity or chance to gain an award or profit 
even where damages are uncertain.”322 
These few and isolated references to loss of chance or opportu-
nity, however, are insufficient to conclude that the theory has been 
accepted in areas other than medical malpractice.  These cases, none-
theless, present situations where the theory would be well-suited and 
would deserve more attention on the part of the legislatures.   
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The theory of loss of chance has gained in understanding since it 
first appeared in the United States almost half a century ago.323  Yet, 
the majority of the states continues to reject it, sometimes based on 
flawed arguments.324  The American probabilistic approach to causa-
tion has been an undeniable obstacle to the theory’s broader accep-
tance among the states.325  Some states, nonetheless, have chosen to 
disregard the imperfection inherent in the theory and acknowledge 
that the recognition of a loss of chance as a cognizable injury better 
achieves the two ultimate goals of the civil justice system: deterrence 
and compensation.   
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